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1. IF a satisfactory conclusion has been reached in reference to
the vexed question which has now been considered, and which has
given rise to such strongly-conflicting opinions, by jurists of the
highest eminence and ability, the remaining question, where, with
one or two narrow exceptions, the eases and opinions are in
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almost perfect accord, cannot be attended with much difficulty.
It only remains now, then, to be ascertained from those cases and
opinions, to what extent, in the different states of the Union, the
common law is applied in determining what are crimes, and the
nature and degree of punishment consequent thereupon.
2. A distinguished American jurist,1 in reply to a question put
to him by the Commissioners on Administration of Justice in the
West Indies, answers, in a few words, nearly the whole of the
questions which are the subject of this part of the dissertation.
He says: "In general it may be stated that the law of England,
in its broadest sense, including the system of common law and
equity, is the foundation of our jurisprudence. Except such
parts of the common law and statute law as never were applicable
to our local circumstances and condition, or such as have become
inconsistent with the nature of our government since the Revolu-
tion, it is everywhere regarded as the rule in cases not provided
for by our own positive institutions. The state of Louisiana forms
an exception to what has been said :" London Jurist for 1828,
p. 434.
8. The state of Ohio may also be considered an exceptional
state, as regards the adoption of the criminal portion of the
common law : .Key v. Vattier, 1 Ohio 60 ; 'Fan Valkenburg v.
The State, 16 Ohio 404. In this r~spect, Ohio may be considered
in the same position as the national courts; adopting the forms,
rules of evidence, and general modes of procedure of the common
law, but depending upon statutory enactments for the enumeration
of crimes, and the declaration of punishments. Louisiana, as has
been seen (supra, p. 2, § 46,2), has adopted the common law, by
statute, to supply the deficiencies of their criminal code.
4. It may, therefore, with the exceptions above named, be laid
down as a general proposition, that, in all- the states of the Union,
the common law of England has been adopted in its fullest extent,
so far as it is adapted to the circumstances of this country, and
so far as it has not been modified or abrogated by statute. To
this effect are authorities infinite in number.3
IMr. Wheaton.
e And see D-u Ponceau on Juris. 75-82; Parsons v.'Bedford, a Peters S. C.
433, 449.
3 See I Bish. Cr. Law, p. i5, n. 4, citing statutes and cases in full detail in
reference to the different states.
TO THE DETERMINATION OF C1IMES.
.5. The compinn law of England, so adopted, consists not o.rly
-&f that common law, in its English sense, but, as has been observed
in the first part of this treatise (Part 1, § 15), of the English
statutes passed in amendment of it previous to the settlement of
this country, and of other acts subsequently passed that were
specially adopted, so far as the same were suited to the circum-
stances of this country.'
6. To undertake, in the limits of this article, to point out the
particular circumstances that have been held to have modified the
common law, upon its adoption here, and the manner in which it
has been subsequently affected by the legislation of the different
states, would be entirely impracticable. To show the manner in
which some half-dozen states alone have, in some respects, made
by their legislation, particular provision for the definition and
punishment of acts that were crimes at common law, takes up
nearly the whole of the second volume of 'Mr. Wharton's elaborate
treatise on criminal law. The general principle, as stated in the
last paragraph, seems all that is necessary to be here particularly
referred to in the matter.
7. It may be said, generally, that all offences that were felonies
at common law, have been made the subject of specific legislation
in all the states, and that while, in most of the states, the defini-
tion of the particular offence, as murder, manslaughter, burglary,
arson, larceny, &c., has been left as at common law2 and is
subject to a common-law indictment, the subject is particularly
regulated and pointed out by statute : 1 Bish. Cr. L. 621. It is
a question of little practical importance, however it may be
theoretically, 3 as to what might have been the case in reference
to those higher offences, if they had been committed before the
legislature of the particular state had specifically provided by
statute for their punishment. The reason of the thing is, that in
I See the following cases, among others: Comm. v. Chapman, 13 Met. 68; State
Y. Robbbis, SI . H. 550; Gomm. v.. Leach, 1 Mass. 59; Republic Y. Dan, 1 Dallas
86; McLain v. Hayne, 3 Brev. 299; State v. Hodgede,, 3 Vt. 485; United States
v. Worrall, 2 Dallas 394; State v. Owen. 1 Murphey 452; Comm. v. l ebster, 5
Cush. 303; 51tate v. Danforth, 3 Conn. 112.
2 State v. Chandler, 2 Harring. (Del.) 554 ; Unital States N. Smith, 4 Cranch
C. C. 637 ; Comm. v. Call, 21 Pick. 510; Trial of Peter York, 7 Law R1. 515;
Wright v. The State, 9 Ycrger 342; Comm. v. Dalcy, 4 FPa. Law J. 155; Armor
v. The State, 3 Ilumph. 385 ; Comm. Y. Chapman, 13 3let. 68.
3 See Du Poneeau's Treatise on Jurisd. as to this question.
APPLICATION OF THE COMMON LAW
a state where the common law is held to be in force as far as
adapted to the state of the country where not changed by statute,
the common-law crimes that were subsequently made punishable
with death by statute, would have previously been held to have
been so punishable at common law.' In California, before there
were opportunities for specific legislation, or even for the organi-
zation of government itself, a common law was recognised and
enforced under the severest penalties (1 Bish. Cr. L." 7), and
there were numerous cases where the penalty of death was sum-
marily inflicted for murder, and for other aggravated offences.
Such, there can scarcely be a doubt, must generally have been
the case in the early settlement of this country, although there
have not been any judicial records preserved of those very early
proceedings.
8. In one very early. case it was held that prior to the perma-
nent establishment of a government in this country, at the time of
the Revolution of 1776, though no express provision had been at
any time made for defining what should be treason against such
temporary bodies, yet that treason is an offence against common
law, and that allegiance being due from the 28th of November,
1776, when the legislature was convened and the members of the
council were appointed, treason, which is nothing more than a
criminal attempt to destroy the existence of a government, might
certainly have been committed before the different qualities of
the crime were defined, and its punishment provided for and
declared by a positive law: Jacobs v. Adams, 1'Dal. 56, 57.
There are technical difficulties against the principle laid down in
this case, being sustained, which would not apply if the offence
committed had, for instance, been murder or arson. In a still
earlier case than the one last named, before the state of Penn-
sylvania had apparently passed an act -providing or declaring
any specific punishment for murder, such an offence was held
punishable With death at common law: Pennsylvania v. Bell,
Add. Rep. 156.
9. But, however correct these cases may be on principle, they
involve questions not liable very often to come up again;'arid
the only really practical class of crimes now punishable at com-
mon law, is composed of misdemeanors, 2 such as malicious mis-
i As murder, burglary, arson, &c., were: 1 Ch. Cr. L.. 705; 1 Bish. Cr. L. 622.
P For definition of crimes which include misdemeanors, see 4 Blk. Com. 5. And
see New York Rev. St. (1859), Vol. 3, p. 990, § 43.
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chief; breaches of the peace and acts tending th'et, : acts
tending to shock or injure the morals of the community, and
other analogous offences, which, at common law, are punishable
with fine and imprisonment: 2 Russ. on Cr. (1st Am. ed.") 1:381.
The remainder of this part will be devoted to cases of these'
descriptions.
10. The following from the " Gazette," a .newspaper published
in Portland, Me., April 8th 1799, from the observations of Mr.
Chief Justice DANA, prior to passing sentence (Comm. v. Adams,
16 Am. Jur. 109, s. c. Thacher's Cr. Gas. 459 n.) for the pub-
lication of a false, scandalous, and mischievous libel' against the
legislature of the commonwealth, will be found. of interest, from.
the early period in which the case was decided, as well as from
its applicability to this question. Not only is the applicability
of the common law to crimes and punishments shown in this case,
but the way in which the degree of punishment is to be regulated,
viz. to be determined by the judges, governed by principles of
reason, and influenced by precedents in previous similar or analo-
gous cases, restrained besides only by the principle of article 8th
of the amendments to the constitution prohibiting the infliction
of excessive fines and of cruel and unusual punishents,-is, also,
partially to be found in it.
11. The Chief Justice says: "However censurable the libel may
be in itself, it cannot be more dangerous to the public tranquillity
-than the propagation of the principles which have been advanced
by the counsel in defence, that, the indictment being. grounded,
not on any statute, but the common law of England only, ought
not to be supported, as that law had no force or operation within
the United States ; that the common law was inconsistent with
those republican principles contemplated and avowed in our
constitution, and inapplicable to the genius and nature of our
government. Such doctrines were unheard of among us till of
late. Those who have urged them would deprive us of what we
have long been taught to cherish as our birth-right and best inhe-
ritance. Indeed, without the aid of the common law, every
lawyer must .know it would be impracticable to proceed in the
distribution of justice, civil or criminal. So sensible were the
citizens of the United States of the truth of this observation, that,
I See Comm. V. Chapman, 13 'Mct. 68; State v. Burnham, 9 N. II. "s: 9tbt v.
Avery, 7 Conn. 270; Hodges v. The State, 5 Humph. 114.
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when forAhing their constitutions, they carefully, in almost all
of them, secured its operation, so far as their local condition
admitted, unless repugnant to their constitutions." This is then
shown by extracts from the constitutions of a number of the
states, after which the Chief Justice observes: "Thus it is
beyond all question, that the citizens of America have anxiously
secured to themselves the full operation of the common law of
England, so far as it is applicable to our local condition, and not
repugnant to their respective constitutions. Let every one now
judge how unfounded are the novel, disorganizing doctrines that
the common law of England, under the restrictions stated as
above, has no force or operation within the United States,-that
it is inconsistent with those republican principles contemplated
and avowed in our constitution, and inapplicable to the genius
and nature of our government. If our constitutidn were silent
respecting the common law of England, yet I. might challenge
the soundest lawyer to show how he could carry into effect that
constitution, or many of our acts made under it, without a recur-
rence to the common law. We have, for example, a statute
against treason, by which it is enacted that a citizen of this'state,
who shall levy war against it, shall be deemed guilty of that'
offence: but to find what facts may amount to that levying of war,
we must resoi.t to the law of England, from which the expressions
are borrowed. We have acts against murder and burglary'; but
those terms are technical, the acts in which they are used do not
define them, and we go to the common-law decisions for their
legal import." In passing sentence, the court say : "The court
has considered every circumstance of alleviation which relates to
you (the defendant), not forgetting your poor state of health, and
in the sentence which the clerk is now to read, we have aimed at
giving judgment in mercy."
12. In the plethora of material on hand, all that can- be
attempted to be done is merely to give representative cases.
Numerous other cases than the following might be cited estab-
lishing like principles. In Tennessee, it was held (Grisham v.
The State, 2 Yerger 595), that, as the common law is the
guardian of the morals of the people, acts or conduct notoriously
against public decency and good manners constitute an offence
at common law, and punishable as such. In Vermont, it was
held (State v. Briggs, 1 Aiken 280), that the wounding and
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torturing a living animal, not only with force and a-rm. 1)lt with
wicked and malicious motives and intentions, was a misdemeanor
to be punished by .the judges, at common law. In Alabama
(State v. Cawood, 2 Stew. 360), the court, hfter laying down the
principle that the common law, so far as applicable, is the rule
of action in the state, both in civil and criminal proceedings
where not affected by statute, and that therefore conspiracies are
indictable offences; and, that, where no specific punishment is
declared by statute, and the old common-law punishment is taken
away, the ordinary common-law punishment, for misdemeanor, to
which no other punishment is assigned, of fine and imprisonment,
will be inflicted, go on to say: "This doctrine, in the case of a
common scold, underwent a very able discussion in the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, a few-years ago, in which.Judge DtIIWAN
delivered a very able opinion, deciding that though the ducking-
stool could no longer be used, fine and imprisonment might be
substituted. And, we believe, in the celebrated case of The
United States v. Ann Boyal, under the influence of the common
law, the defendant was punished with fine and imprisonment."
In reference to the punishment, at common law, it is worthy of
notice, as something remarkable, that, in the case of The U ited
States v. Worrall, 2 Dallas 3 8 4 ,r after the judges (CHASE and.
PETERS) had differed as to the common-law jurisdiction of the
national courts, they still went on and inflicted upon the defend-
ant the common-law punishment of fine and imprisonment.
14. At the Supreme Judicial Court in the county-of Suffolk,
Mass., February Term 1803, Abel Boynton and four other persons
were convicted at common law of a conspiracy to cheat and
defraud by false pretences. They were sentenced to sit in the
pillory and to be imprisoned in the common gaol. l'ierpont and
another 2 Were also tried at the same term of the same court for a
conspiracy at common law to defraud anderwriters, and-were also
sentenced to the pillory and to imprisonment in the common
gaol. The former old common-law punishment has now become
obsolete.
3
15. Driving a carriage through a crowded or populous street,
at such a rate or in such a manner as to endanger the safety of
I Sce supra, p. 2, § 13.
2 See Comm. v. tHunt, Thach. Cr. Cas. 609.
3 See, as to this Iunisluncnr, post, § 35.
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the inhabitants, has been held (United States v. Hart, 1 Peters
C. C. 390) an indictable offenee at common law, and amounting
to a breach of the peace.
16. In North Carolina it was held (State v. Huntley, 8 Iredell
418) that the offence of riding or going armed with unusual or
dangerous weapons so as to naturally terrify and alarm a peaceful
people, is an offence at common law. The court said: "If these
acts be deemed by the common law crimes and misdemeanors
which are in violation of the public rights and of the duties owing
to the community in its social capacity, it is difficult to imagine
any which more unequivocally deserve to be so considered, than
the acts charged upon this defendant. They attack directly that
public order and sense of 'security which it is one of the first
objects of the conmon law to presetve inviolate."
17. It has been seen (supra, § 15), that a conspiracy to cheat
and defraud is punishable at common law. So, also, have a
great variety of other conspiracies been likewise held indictable:
Cornnal v. Faering, 6 Pa. Law J. 281; Comm. v. Sylvester,
Id. 283, s. c. Brightly 331; State v. Younger, 1 Dev. 857;
Comm. v. Dupuy, Brightly 44; Comm. v. Foering, Id. 815;
Lambert v. The People, 7 Cow. 166; Comm., v. Judd,. 2 Mass.
883 ; Comm. v. Tibbets, Id. 536; Comm. v. Woods, 7 Law R. 60.
In one of these, it was especially objected that the offence charged
was a crime unknown to the law of the state, but it was held, that,
although the offence was not a statutory one, yet that it was an
offence at common law, and punishable as such. The court said:
"The nature of the offence for which the prisoner was held to
bail shows it to have been held indictable. Though there is, per-
haps, no case exactly in point, we do not hesitate to pronounce it
triminal':" Rhoadeg v. The Comm., 15 Penn. St. R. 277.
18. So cheating of various kinds has .been held indictable at
common ltw: Repub. v. Sweers, 1 Dallas 45; Repub. v. Powell,
Id. 47; State v. Patillo, 4 Hawks 848. In the first of these
cases it was held, that "if a cheat is prejudicial, that is, of such
a nature as may prejudice," an inlictment. at common law will
well lie. The old common-law punishment of pillory was inflicted
in this case, in addition to the present common-law punishment,
for such offences, of fine and imprisonment.
19. It has previously been noticed (supra, p. 1, § 23) that in
England many offences are punishable in the ecclesiastical courts
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that are here punishable by force of the common law. In Eng-
land, not only is Christianity established by law, but to enforce
its moral code, the ecclesiastical courts are provided with a spe-
cial power over such offences. In this country, Christianity, as
a spiritual system, is not established by law, but as a moral and
economical system, it is, and to enforce it in this relation, all the
economical and moral jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical tribunals
of England have been borrowed and worked into the common-law
courts of this country: 2 Whart. Cr. L., § 2545. In one case
(UpdegraA v. The Comm., 11 S. & R. 400), the court says:
"Christianity, general Christianity, is, and always has been, a
part of our common law, and maliciously to vilify the Christian
religion is -an indictable offence. For atheism, blasphemy, and
reviling the Christian religion, there have been instances of pro-
secution (State v. Chandler, 2 Harring. 554; The People v.
Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290) at the common law, but bare non-con-
formity is no sin by the common law." It has also been held
(Comm. v. Dupuy, Brightly 44), that where three or more per-
sons agree to go to a church where divine service is to be
performed, and to laugh and talk during the performance of the
same, in a manner which might be excusable in a tavern; and,
in so doing, manifest a determination to resist by force any effort
that may be made to remove them, or prevent their doing so, -they
will be guilty of riot at common law: United States v. Brooks,
4 Cranch C. C. 427.
20. Offences against the marital relation, which are also in
England only cognisable in the ecclesiastical courts,' and which
involve, in fact, the whole class of offences against chastity,
have been held indictable in this country at common law, even
when unaccompanied by force.2 In England, they would not be
so held, unless amounting to a public nuisance.
21. The publication of obscene writings or prints, gross and
public lewdness, indecent public exposure of the person, common
houses of prostitution (Comm. v. Harrington, 3 Pick. 26), and
even the frequenting of such houses, have been adjudged to be
offences at common law, as acts tending to destroy the public
1 2 Whart. Cr. L. 2545; Grishaw v. The State, 2 Ycrger 595 ; State v. Graham,
3 Sneed 134. And see supra, p. 1, § 23 and-n .
2 See 2 Whart. Cr. L. §§ 2545, 2648-2651, and cases cited. But see, contra, I
Bish. Cr. L. § 46.
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morals: United States v. Brooks, 4 Cranch 0. 0. 427; Comm.
v. SharTpless, 2 S. & R. 91; Barker v. The Comm., 7 Harris
(Pa. St. R.) 413; Bell v. ie State, 1 Swan 45; State v. Moor,
Id. 136; State v. Dowd, 7 Conn. 384; Britain v. The State, 3
Humph. 203. In one of these cases, in which it was held that
the utterance of obscene words in public, being a gross violation
of public decency and good morals, is indictable at common law,
the court, .after pointing out the well-established principles of the
common law applicable to the case, say: "These adjudications
(which have been decided without the aid of any statutory enact-
ment), we think, furnish analogies sufficiently strong to sustain
the present prosecution. But were there no analogy to be drawn
from any decided case, we hold, that, upon the broxd principles
of the common law, which we have stated, this prosecution is most
amply sustained. Thus fortified by sound principles-principles
which lie at the foundation of every well-regulated community,
and resting on a basis so immutable, we are the more indifferent
as to precedents exactly in point. The gist of this offence is the
gross violation of good morals and public decency, and for which,
according to the argument, there is no precedent to be found;
and, if required for the first time to make one, as we hesitate not
to do, we must be guided by .principles, sensible and practicable
in .themselves :" Bell v. The State, 1 Swan 45. So, profane
swearing in public, is, in this country, indictable as a nuisance
(State v. Kirby, 1 Murphey 254; State v. Graham, 3 Sneed 134);
and it has also been held, that though private drunkenness is not
an indictable offence, drunkenness becomes an offence when it is
open and exposed to public view to that extent that it becomes a'
nuisance, commune nocumentum: Smith v. The State, 1 Humph.
898 ; State v. Waller, 3 Murphey 229.
22. There has been another class of. cases peculiar to this
country, viz.: those connected with slavery, where the principles
of the common law have been applied so' as to meet and punish
various offences for which no statutory provision had .been made:
State v. Hardin, 2 Dev. & B. 412. Thus, it was held in Ten-
nessee, that if a master cause and permit.his slaves to pass .about
in public view, indecently naked, he is guilty of lewdness, and
indictable therefor at common law: Britain v. The State, 3
Humph. 203
23. In a case in lorth Carolina, in holding that an unjustifiable
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battery e,-mmitted on another's slave was indictable, the court
said: "As there is no positive law decisive of the question, a
solution of it must be deduced from general principles, from
reasonings founded on the common law, adapted to the existing
condition and circumstances' of our society, and indicating that'
result which is best adapted to general experience." Upon the
application of these principles, it was decided, that, although a
slave was " not protected by the general criminal law of the state,
still, he was within the protection of the common law :" State v.
Hale, 2 Hawks 582. It has also been held, that to cruelly,
in humanly, and maliciously cut, slash, beat, and ill-treat one's
own slave is an indictable offence at common law (United States
v. Brockett, 2 Cranch C. 0. 441); and, in another case, that the
owner of a slave who beats him cruelly, and exposes him, so
beaten, to public view, is guilty of a misdemeanor at common
law; aid he was, accordingly, punished with a fine: United
States v. Lloyd, 4 Cranch C. 0. 470. So, in another very inte-
resting case, it was contended, that, as slavery was unknown to
the common law, killing a slave could not be murder at common
law; but this was not sustained, the court holding that a law
of paramount obligation to the statute law was violated by the
offence-the common law, founded upon the law of nature, and
confirmed by revelation: State v. 1Reed, 2 Hawks 454.1
24. There are some other cases to which the penetrating influ-
ence of the common law has been applied, altogether peculiar to
this country. Thus, it has been held that raising a liberty pole
in 1794, amounting to symptoms of dissatisfaction -with govern-
ment, and tending to promote ill-feelings, is an offence at common
law: Penna. v. lforrison, Addison's R. 274. And for tearing
down an advertisement, in case of a sale under a' public law, for
a public use, is an offence at common law, and indictable for the
public injury: -Penna. v. Gillespie, Id. 267. And on the prin-
ciple that where a statute gives a privilege, any violation of such
privilege will be punished by the common law, it was held, in
Massachusetts, that illegally voting more than once for the choice
of selectmen was indictable and punishable at common law:
Gomm. v. Silsbee, 9 Mass. 417.
25. Another large class of cases which, as has been seen
I And see, to same effect, State v. Samuel, 2 Dev. & B. 184.
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(supra, p. 1, § 24), has been provided for in England by a
lengthy series of statutes, has generally been left in this country
to be acted upon by the common law. This class comprises cases
of malicious mischief, which are very numerous and varied. In
one of these cases, which was an indictment at common law, for
maliciously killing a horse,1 the attorney-general contended that
every act of a public evil example, and against good morals, is
an offence indictable at common law, and punishable without a
statute, even though the offence charged were an unprecedented
one. The court, in sustaining this view and the indictment, say:
"1 It seems to be agreed that whatever amounts to a public wrong
may be made the subject of indictment. The poisoning of
chickens, cheating with false dice, fraudulently tearing a promis-
sory note, ad many other offences, have heretofore been held
indictable. Breaking windows by throwing stofnes at them,
though a sufficient number of persons were not engaged to render
it a riot, and the embezzlement of public moneys, have likewise
been deemed public wrongs, and have been held indictable at
common law :" _Bepub. v. Teischer, 1 Dall. 837.
.26. .Among the numerous acts that have been held indictable
as malicious mischief, are, maliciously killing a cow, The People
v. Smith, 5 Cowen 258, or a steer: The State v. Scott, 2 Dev.
& B. 85 : maliciously poisoning cattle: Comm. v Leach, 1 Mass.
59; maliciously burning a large number of barrels of tar: State
v. Simpson, 2 Hawks 460; and generally that malicious mischief
to property is a misdemeanor at common law, and may be pun-
ished criminally: Bump v. Betts, 19 Wend. 420. In another
case the court, in rendering judgment, say: "1 This is an indict-
ment for destroying an ornamental tree on public ground. For
,the commonwealth it was contended that it was a maxim in the
law that there was no injury without a remedy, and this being a
public loss and injury, nothing but an indictment would lie; that
it is the malicious intent that constitutes the crime, and that
every act of a public evil example, and against good morals, is
indictable at common law." The court sustained the indictment,
and sentenced the defendant to pay a fine and costs: Comm. v.
Echert, 2 P. A. Browne's R. 250.
27. A great variety of acts have been held indictable at com-
mon law, as acts of a public evil example, or acts such as to
I See, also, State v. Council, I Overton 305.
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amount to a public nuisance, or such as would work an injury to
the community. In one of these cases the court enunciate the
following principle: "In the absence of positive acts of the legis-
latire," say the court, "we know of no rule or criterion by
which an act can be ascertained to be criminal but that of its'
being against the interest of the state. The act must have the
necessary ingredient of possibility of injuring the community, or
an individual of that community, in a manner which the good of
the whole requires to be repressed. Apart from this considera-
tion, it is not for courts to inquire how the act stands in a moral
or religious point of view :" State v. Dodd, 8 MIurphey 228.
Within the range of this class of cases, it has been held to be an
indictable offence at common law to be guilty of public cruelty to
a cow in or near a public street in Washington as a public nui-
sance: United Stateg v. Jackson, 4 Cranch's C. C. 483. So, for
for the same reason, keeping a pig-sty in Philadelphia (Comm. v.
Van Sickle, Brightly 69), or near a public road in a thickly
settled rural district (Comm. v. .Kutz, Id. 75 n.), have been held
.to be, per se, indictable offences at common law. Placing a stall
for selling fruit, &c., on the footway of a public street, although
the owner pay rent to the owner of the adjoining premises (Comm.
v. -Wentworth, Id- 818), obstructing a highway (Kelly v. The
Comm., 11 S. & R. 345) ; building a stone wall in a highway so
as to amount to an obstruction (State v. Smith, 7 Conn. 428) ;
"constables obstructing the street by selling goods, taken under
execution, at public auction, even though required by a statute to
dispose of them at public sale (Comm. v. Miliman, 13 S. & R.
403); erecting a dani in a navigable river, which is a highway
(Comm. v. Church, 1 Barr 105), have all been held indictable as
nuisances at common law. So, as it is a principle of social,
natural, and municipal law, that each individual shall so use his
own property as not to injure the public health; in a case where,
by a special act, a mil]:dam was allowed to be built, it was held
that, notwithstanding this, when the mill-dam became a nuisance
and injurious to public health, it was indictable at common law:
Statd v. Gainer, 3 Humph. 89. So, the keeping of a common
gaming-house has been held indictable as a public nuisance, be-
cause of the necessary injury to the morals of the community
resulting from such an establishment: State v. Mathews, 2 Dev.
& B. 426. And, as an offence against common decency, casting
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a dead body into'a river, without the rites of Christian sepulture)
has been also held indictable at common law: Kanavan's Case,
1 Greenl. 226. In all of these cases, wherever the punishment
is named, it is either a fine at common law or imprisonment; and,
where the place of imprisonment is named, the common gaol.
28. Another class of acts, closely allied to the above, and
which are also made punishable by the common law, consists of
acts which are injurious to private persons, which tend to excite
violent resentment, and thus produce fighting and disturbance of
the peace of society. In one case-in which the court say that
it is impossible to find precedents for all offences, and that "the
malicious ingenuity.of mankind is constantly producing new
inventions in the act of disturbing their neighbors. To this
invention must be opposed general principles calculated to meet
and punish them"a-it was held that going secretly into a house
after night and making "a great noise," so as to frighten a
married woman and cause her miscarriage, was indictable at
common law: Comm. v. Taylor, 5 Binn. 279. In another case,
in which the court say that, by the provisions of the constitution,
the common law still retains its character as the common pre-
server of the'"peace of the land, and that it punishes as public
offences against man, acts tending to create a breach of the public
peace, and to endanger the public safety, they add: "1 He who
disinters the dead and exposes the corpse to the public gaze; he
who appears naked in the streets of a populous town, as Sir
Charles Sedley did in London; every one who outrages decency
so far as to incite others to a breach of the peace, is indictable at
common law, although his conduct should adtually inflict personal
violence on no one :" State v. Chandler, 2 Harring. 554. In this
.class of cases it has been held indictable in this country to
challenge another to fight with fists (Comm. v.- Whitehead, 2
Law R. 148) ; to challenge' another to fight a duel, even though
the duel is to be fought in another state (State v. Warner, 1
Hawks 492), and even expressing a readiness to fight with deadly
weapons, as tending to provoke such a combat, has been held
indictable at common law: Comm.. v. Tibbs, 1 Dana (Ky.) 524.
A great variety of other acts have also, on the same ground, been
held indictable; as the erection and exhibition of a "stuffed
paddy" (Comm. v. Haines, 6 Pa. Law J. 239), (an image of
St. Patrick); counselling to commit offences of a high and
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aggravated character, such as are considered mnala in se (Comm.
v. Willard, 22 Pick. 478) ; persuading, instigatihg, or inciting
another to commit a breach of the peace ( United States v. Lyles,
4 Cranch's C. C.469), or inciting others to insurrection, riot,
and tumult: United States v. Tenwick, Id. 675. In all of these
cases, too, where the punishment is named, it is either fine or
imprisonment.
29. There are also various acts against, or tending to defeat,
public justice, which are indictable at common law. Thus, it has
been held that the escape from prison of a person, lawfully impri-
soned for a breach of the peace, without breaking the prison or
cbmmitting any other actual violence, is, at common law, an
offence against public justice, and punishable with fine and impri-
sonment: State v. Doud, 7 Conn. 884. On the same ground,-
the persuading a witness not to attend a public prosecution on the
part of the state has been held indictable (State v. Keyes, 8 Vt.
67) ; and the separation of a jury, without permission of the court,
before rendering their verdict, has been repeatedly held to be a
misdemeanor, for which the jurors may be punished at common
law: Cannon v. The State, 8 Texas 85; TWright v. Burchfield,
3 Ohio 52; Brown v. McConnell, 1 Bibb 265. So, it has been
held in New York, that, whenever justices of the peace act par-
tially or oppressively, from a malicious or corrupt motive, they
may be punished criminally: The People v. Goon, 15 Wend. 278.
Discharging an offender without requiring sufficient sureties, when
it is done with the intent to pervert the course of law akd justice,
is clearly an offence at common law: Ibid. It has also been
held, that, when a public law imposes a public duty upon a single
person, or a number of persons, the omission to perform the duty
is sufficient to justify an indictment at common law: State v.
Williams, 12 Iredell 177. To detain a writ, for the purpose and
with the intention of preventing the course of public justice, is an
offence at common law, and an indictment will well lie therefor:
State v. Lovett, 8 Vt. 118.
80. A great variety of other acts have been held indictable by
force of the common law. In Tennessee, where exclusive cogni-
sance had been given to the county courts, of all indictments for
assault and battery, it was held, that, by the common law, the
Supreme Court, possessing a general jurisdiction, had cognisance
of assault and battery with intent to kill, for which an indictment
" " 8 135
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was sustained, notwithstanding the statute, and the defendant was
sentenced to be punished with fine and imprisonment: State v.
Anjerson, 2 Overton 6. Eaves-dropping, has also been held
indictable: Comm. v. Lovatt, 6 Pa. Law J. 226; State v. Wil-
liams, 2 Overton 108. In the latter of these eases cited, it was
contended that as there was no statute on the subject, and no
precedent could be found in the state, the indictment was bd,
but the court replied: "1 Agreeably to the common law such an
indictment well lies, and nothing can be seen in this part of it
which is inconsistent with our situation, or, in fact, with the situ-
ation of any society whatever." And the indictment was held
good. Knowingly selling unwholesome provisions is a misde-
.meanor at cimmon law: State v. Norton, 2 Iredell 41. So is
the mixing of poisonous ingredients in food or drink designed for
any individual, whether done through malice, or a design of gain:
State v. Buckman, 8 N. H. 205. On this ground it was held,
that, where an individual had thrown the carcase of an animal
into a well, which tainted and corrupted the water used by a
family, an indictment would be sustained, as charging an offence
at common law: Ibid. Assault, and false imprisonment, and
kidnapping, have been held indictable at common law, when there
was no statute relating thereto: Click v. The State, 3 Texas 285;
State v. Rollins, 8 N. H. 550. So have forgery (State v. Talker,
N. C. T. R. (Taylor's R.) 229; Comm. v. Chandler, 2 Law R.
122); uttering bank-notes with the intent to deceive and defraud
(Comm. v. Boynton, 2 Mass. 77); and extortion, where there
has been the receipt of money, or of some thing of value: Comm.
v. Cony, 2 Mass. 523. It was also held, in Connecticut, that a
battery, with intent to kill, is, by the commbn law in force in the
state, a high crime and misdemeanor, but that imprisonment for
life cannot be inflicted at common law,, as it is contrary to the
principles thereof, being both indefinite and unreasonable: State
v. .Danforth, 3 Conn. 112. Forcible entry into a dwelling-house
has also been held indictable at common law-, although there was
a statute in force providing for restitution; the statute still leav-
ing the parties, the one to his action for danages; the other.to
his liability to be indicted and punished at common law: Hard-
ing's Case, 1 Greenl. 22, 27. And, in Vermont, Mr. Justice
REDFIELD, i'n deciding that an indictment at common law lies for
an assault, and resisting one in the execution of any legal autho-
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rity or power, even though provision has been made by statute
for a higher penalty, says: "As the statute has only superadded
the higher penalty for the offence, this does not take away the
right to proceed against the offender for the offence at common
law, which can only be punished with fine and imprisonment in
the common gaol :" State v. Downer, 8 Vt. 429.
31. There is only room for one or two more such instances,
which must close the list of this description of cases. Thus, it
has been held that the production of abortion or miscarriage is an
offence at common law (Comm. v. Demain, Brightly 441) ; and,
ih Massachusetts, under an indictment for rape on a child under
ten years of age, which was insufficient under the statute, the
court passed sentence as for a misdemeanor at common law,
thereby sustaining the indictment at common law, which had
proved insufficient under the statute: Comm. v. Lanigan, 2 Law
R. 49. In an extremely interesting case, which was decided in
the infancy of this country (A. D. 1788), where the defendant
was sentenced to fine and imprisonment for contempt of court,
the power of the common law is very conspicuously 'displayed.
The question having been subsequently taken before the legisla-
ture, the judges, and the power of the common law, against the
most intense opposition, were triumphantly sustained: Repub. v.
Oswald, 1 Dallas 319. There is no room here for the fuller
exposition of the important principles developed in this case.
32. A few, of an entirely different- description of .cases, may
be given, where the further power of the common law is mani-
fested. Thus, it has been decided, on common-law authorities,
that, if a servant lodging in the same house, unlatches the door
of his master's bed-room, with intent to kill him, it is burglary:
United States v. Bowen, 4 Oranch 0. 0. 604. But that it is
not burglary, at common law, to break the door of a store. situate
within three feet of the dwelling, and enclosed in the same yard:
State v. Langford, 1 Dev. 253. In State v. Gibson, 10 Iredell
216, the court, in justifying the return of a blow in self-defence,
say: " Our sturdy ancestors who built up the common law did
not require a man to turn and flee when he received a blow. He
is allowed to return blow for blow, provided he does not give an
excessive blow, not called for by the occasion ;" and, this, they
put not exclusively on the ground of self-defence, but, because it
tends to prevent a repetition of the act. And, according to the
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old principles of the common law,' animals that are ferce naturme
are not the subject of larceny (Comm. v. Chace, 9 Pick. 15);
and, on the same old principles, an indictment for horse-stealing
will not lie where there has been no trespass in the original
taking: State v. Braden, 2 Overton 69; Pelter v. The State, 9
Yerger 404. In the last of these two cases cited, the court say:
"1 The rule laid down by Coke and Hale, Hawkins and Blackstone,
that there must be a taking invito domino, and that there can be
no felony without a trespass, is a plain rule, comprehensive by
every capacity, and, in its nature, not easy to be misunderstood;
it leaves no latitude to the judge, nor any to the jury." In
Pennsylvania, it has been held, that the destruction of a child,
in gremio matris, is murder at common law, and said, citing
Bracton and numerous later authorities, that the distinction taken
in Massachusetts as to quickness, is recognised nowhere else:
Comm. v. Demain, 6 Pa. Law J. 29. And, in Tennessee (Cash
v. The State, 2 Overton 199), it has been decided, on common-
law authority,2 that to make a man guilty of an affray, it is not
essential that the fighting took place with the assent of both
parties. It is because the violence is committed in a public
place, and to the terror of the people, that the crime is called an
affray, and not an assault and battery. And, on similar autho-
rity,3 it has been held that if death happens beyond a year and a
day, after a wound is .given, the law presumes that the death
happens from some other cause than the wound: State v. Orrell,
1 Dev. 141. By the common law it is felony for a man who
elopes-with another's wife, to take the husband's goods, though
with the consent and at the solicitation of the wife (The People
v. Schuyler, 6 Cowen 572); and, on common-law authorities,
4
false swearing by a witness in reply to .a question asked him for
the purpose of impairing his testimony, is perjury: State v.
Street, 1 Murphey 124. Again, " In conformity to the principles
of the common law," held, in North Carolina, that an accomplice
is a competent witness for the prosecution, on the trial of his
associate (State v. Vier, 1 Dev. 863); and, "in accordance
with the well-established doctrine of the common law," held, in
I See 1 Hale's P. C., c. 13, p. 510, § 5.
2 See I Hawks P. C., tit. Assault, Battery, and Affray.
3 2 Co. Inst. 218; and see supra, p. 1, § 28.
C See I Hawks P. C. 323.
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Tennessee, that where a defendant, in an indictment for homicide
or felonious assault, relies upon the plea of self-defence, by reason
of his fears of death or great bodily harm from his antagonist,
he must show by proof that his fears were based on reasonable
grounds: Aforgan v. Te State, 3 Sneed 475. In New York,
it was held, that, as their statute is but confirmatory of the com-
mon law, the common-law doctrine of autrefois acquit obtains
there: The People v. Saunders, 4 Parker 199. Various ques-
tions connected with evidence (Hill's Case, " Gratt. 607), trials
by jury (State v. Ben, I Hawks 436 ; State v. Curtis, 5 Humph.
603), justices of the peace (State v. Ellar, 1 Dev. 267 ; State v.
Barrow, 3 Murphey 122), accessories (Comm. v. Knapp, 9 Pick.
513; State v. Jernagan, N. 0. T. R. (Taylor's R.) 49), infants
(Comm. v. McKeagy, 1 Ash. 256; State v. Le Blanc, 3 Brev.
339), insanity (Carter v. The State, 12 Texas 500), drunkenness
(United States v..Drew, 5 Mason 28), and a great variety of
other matters, where the full influence of the principles of the
common law is brought to bear, have to pass without particular
notice, but are all included in the general principles laid down in
previous parts of this dissertation. It may be well to state, that,
in matters of crime, so general is tha influence of the common
law, every offence for which a party is indicted is supposed to be
prosecuted, as an offence at common law, unless the prosecutor,
by reference to a statute, shows that he means to proceed upon
the statute; and, without such express reference, if it be no
offence at common law, the court will not look to see if it be an
offence at all: Peas' Case, 2 Gratt. 636. And, as has been
seen (supra, p. 3, § 24), and as is also shown, in a case of assault
and battery, in Massachusetts, so great is the expansive power
of the common law, that, in entirely new cases, the principles of
the common law will open and take them in: Comm. v. Power,
7 Met. 596.
33. A few words further may be necessary in reference to the
nature and degree of punishment consequent upon the commission
of crimes at common law. It has been before noticed (supra,
p. 3, § 7) that all the crimes that were punishable, capitally, at
common law, have been provided for by statute; and it has also
been seen that as the pillory, the ducking-stool, &c., are now
obsolete, the only common-law punishments that remain practi-
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cally here are fine and imprisonment,' where no punishment is
otherwise provided by statute. It has also been seen that the
punishment must be a reasonable one ; that is, duly proportioned
to the greater or less aggravated nature of the case ; the judges
having, by common law, the right of exercising a reasonable
discretion in the matter: 4 Elk. Com. 378-880; 1 Bish. Cr. L.
§§ 626, 682.
84. In The United States v. Coolidge, 1 Gallison 494,1 STORY,
J., says: "It is a settled principle that where an offence exists,
to which no specific punishment is affixed by statute, it is punish-
able by fine and imprisonment. This is so invariably true, that
in all cases where the legislature prohibit any act without annex-
ing any punishment, the common law considers -it an indictable
offence, and attaches to the breach the penalty of fine and imprison-
ment:" Com. Dig. Indict. D.; 8 Co. 60 b. ; 2 Co. Inst. 181.
85. And again, to the same effect: "When any act is pro-
hibited to be done by statute, and no punishment is prescribed,
the court may inflict a common-law punishment. All offences
which exist at common law, and have not been regulated by
statute, are within the discretion of the court to punish, and the
common-law punishments are fine and imprisonment:" 2 Swift's
Dig. 417 (pillory, &c.,' now obsolete generally): Du Ponceau's
Treat. of Jurisd. ; Lewis v. The Comm., 2 S. & R. 551 ; 1 Bish.
Cr. L. § 628. As all offences at common law to which were
attached a heavier punishment have been regulated by statute,
the above authorities are undoubtedly correct-so limited.
86. In decisions on the degree of punishment, the discretion
of the court is to be exercised on the circumstances of the case :
State v. Kearneyq, 1 Hawks 55. In a case in Pennsylvania,
DUNCAN, J., in discussing the question a to whether involuntary
manslaughter is to be considered a misdemeanor, punishable with
fine and imprisonment, or a felony, punishable by infamous inflic-
tion, discusses the question as to the discretion of the judges in
punishment. "Discretionary punishment as to its quantum, in
eases of misdemeanor, is wisely vested in the courts ;- the degrees
of guilt and the shades and colors of the offences are so various.
Misdemeanor is punished by fine and imprisonment, at the discre-
tion of the court, exercised on a just consideration of all the
I Supra; and see 6 Dane's Ab. 719.
2 See, also, I Kent Com. 317.
